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The Fangs Behind the Mask: Everyday Life in Wartime Chechnya 
 
Introduction – Kevin McSorley 
 
This chapter explores experiences of everyday life in wartime Chechnya1, drawing 
particularly upon the reportage of the Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya2, collected 
in the volumes A Dirty War (2001) (DW) and A Small Corner of Hell (2003) (SCH), 
and the memoirs of the Russian soldier Arkady Babchenko3, published as One Soldier’s 
War in Chechnya (2007) (OSW).  The paper draws upon such a corpus in order to 
highlight some of the mundane details of how the war was experienced, felt and 
negotiated at an individual and interactional level by various participants that were 
affected by it.  The goal here is not to try and shed further light upon what might be 
considered as the broad geopolitical, historical and structural causes of the conflict, or 
the strategic rationales of the various warring parties, except in so much as theories 
about what is happening and why, and an associated discourse of incomprehension and 
rumour, are fundamental features of the lifeworld and personal politics of all those 
caught up in the war. 
 
The chapter argues that wartime Chechnya was an environment in which an over-riding 
sense of uncertainty dominated everyday life for both civilians and soldiers.  I detail a 
widespread sense of confusion over the ever-changing ‘rules of the game’ of wartime 
living.  The chapter aims to illuminate not just the central instability and ontological 
insecurity of life in Chechnya during wartime, but also how this chaotic situation was 
experienced and negotiated at the everyday level of the personal politics of survival and 
coping.  I argue that a complex and shifting range of precarious interactions took place, 
necessitating ambiguous allegiances and indeterminate performances of identity.  
Furthermore, war experience included fluid negotiation of whatever agentic 
possibilities emerged fleetingly and unexpectedly from within the chaos.  Attempts 
were made to hold onto a sense of humanity and civility in the midst of the war through 
fragile performances of love and precarious recitals of ethical codes of interaction.  
Finally, the chapter explores some of the emotional consequences of the tightly 
circumscribed yet fundamentally uncertain experiential trajectories that were rendered 
by and through the war.  I argue that feelings of cynicism and loneliness were dominant 
emotional aftermaths for those who lived through the war.   
 
As Christine Sylvester (2011: 110) notes, at the heart of war there is often a radical 
mismatch we are only beginning to understand, between people’s actual embodied 
experiences of conflict and institutional myths of identity, masculinity and glory in war 
as well as the sophisticated arguments Western theorists have constructed about war’s 
prosecution.  She argues that a crucial task is to investigate in much more detail the 
myriad and often contradictory ways in which people in multiple positions experience 
and narrate the interruptions and changes to their lives before, during and after 
experiencing war.  It is through analytic attention to such lives that we may better come 
“to know war as a comprehensive whole that has a teeming life alongside and 
sometimes in defiance of what statesmen, militaries, strategists and IR specialists say 
about it” (Sylvester 2012: 503).  The analysis in this chapter is situated within that broad 
analytic agenda.  It is also informed by the sociologist Erving Goffman’s analysis of 
the ’interaction order’ and the constitution of self-identity. 
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For Goffman (1959: 173), interaction is a domain of face-to-face social action 
characterized by its own forms of delicate yet fundamental “procedural order” or 
“working consensus.”  Throughout his work, Goffman mobilizes various metaphors of 
ritual, game, and, most significantly, drama as analytic scaffolds to try and illuminate 
aspects of everyday social interaction.  In perhaps his most renowned work, The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), he portrays the individual as a 
dramaturgically skilled interactant who is sensitive to the audience and to other local 
specificities, engages in accomplished ‘impression management,’ and uses the 
dramaturgical arts of projection, consistency and circumspection to deliver a successful 
performance.  Performance is thus understood by Goffman (1959: 15) as “all the 
activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way 
any of the other participants.”   
Goffman’s use of terms such as impression management and influence in describing 
everyday interaction is not meant to imply that such conduct is somehow insincere.  
Indeed, interaction rarely follows any prepared script but rather derives from the skilled 
and shared command of an idiom that is exercised with minimal forethought. While 
consciousness of the performative quality of interaction may arise in the course of some 
social interaction, this is certainly not always the case (Smith 2006).  Furthermore, self-
presentation has a specifically moral character in that there is typically a shared 
expectation that one will be treated in a particular way if presenting in a certain manner.  
Indeed, the quotidian organization of the interaction order continually renews a sacred 
sense of belonging to the social, and the recognition of individual personhood through 
eye contact, turn taking, nodding and so on.  Morality for Goffman is thus 
fundamentally a product of the local social situation, an interactional rather than 
personal construct that is renewed in every encounter.   
 
Relatedly for Goffman, any sense of identity is fundamentally a collaborative and local 
achievement, a ‘dramatic effect’ attributed only in performative interaction with a 
particular audience, and thus always an ongoing and potentially precarious 
accomplishment.  Self-identity is understood in terms of a multiplicity of situated roles, 
a “dance of identification .. to accommodate the changes in footing and multiple voices 
that make up the shifting alignments that occur as individuals respond to local 
circumstances [where] self is nothing more than the capacity to manage these 
alignments” (Smith 2006: 102).  For Goffman there is no additional sense in which a 
‘true self’ resides beyond or hides behind the repertoire of constantly shifting personae 
(a term that Goffman notes originally referred to the masks worn in Greek tragedies) 
that are necessarily played out in social interaction.  Thus Goffman endorses Robert 
Park’s assertion that: 
 
It is probably no mere historical accident that the word person, in its first 
meaning, is a mask.  It is rather a recognition of the fact that everyone is always 
and everywhere, more or less consciously, playing a role .. it is in these roles 
that we know each other; it is in these roles that we know ourselves .. In a sense, 
and in so far as this mask represents the conception we have formed of ourselves 
– the role we are striving to live up to – this mask is our truer self. (Park 1950, 
cited in Goffman 1959: 30)       
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Goffman’s work thus complicates any distinctions between semblance and substance 
(Lawler 2014), surface and depth, being and acting, and sensitizes us to the ways in 
which human recognition, morality and identity is continually constituted in social 
interaction.  As Lawler notes, for Goffman there is ultimately no way to be other than 
to act, we exist only through “masquerading as ourselves” (2014: 116).  Doniger (2005: 
203) similarly argues that, “we assume that masquerades lie, and often they do, at least 
on the surface.  But often masquerades tell a deeper truth, that masquerading as 
ourselves reaffirms an enduring self (or network of selves) inside us.”  For Goffman, 
this is not to be understood as a condition of manipulation, cynicism, or false 
consciousness.  Rather, the smooth dance of everyday interactional masquerading is the 
very stuff of civility and sociality, through which we come to know others and 
ourselves.   
 
The Rules of the Game 
 
Derluguian (2003: 8) argues that the wars in Chechnya were overdetermined, with 
different scholars and commentators emphasizing various different combinations of 
sufficient causes ranging from “historical legacies, imperial geopolitics, political 
instability, oil, Islam, organized crime, and now, atop of all, al Qaeda.”4  Whatever the 
complex genealogy of the causes of the conflicts, chaotic uncertainty and seemingly 
arbitrary predation dominated the experiential lifeworlds of many of those caught up in 
them.  The wars were characterised by Russian Federation forces engaging in the 
massive artillery bombardment of cities, towns and villages followed by periods of 
counter-insurgency warfare “in which virtually the entire civilian population of 
Chechnya came to be seen as the enemy” (Lapidus 1999: 64).  Once Federal forces had 
assumed control of an area, they commonly deployed ‘special operations’, colloquially 
known as zachistka, whose official aim was “to check people’s residence permits and 
identify participants of illegal armed formations” (Memorial 2007), but which in 
practice involved widespread war crimes against civilians including massacres, rape, 
torture and looting (Bellamy 2012).  Indeed, Evangelista argues that, “from the first 
days of the first invasion, the Russian armed forces .. violated the laws of war on a vast 
scale” (2002: 8). 
 
Politkovskaya describes the unbridled lawlessness that dominated life under occupation 
for the residents of the villages in the Uras-Martan district of Chechnya.  She writes: 
“There’s nothing here for those who remained, except for the infamous Chechen 
‘package’: Federal raids, night purges, marauding, morning discussions of who was 
taken away this time and what was stolen along with them, regular burials, stories about 
the ways those who survived were tortured, and whose corpses looked like what” (SCH: 
116).  The purges consisted of blockading villages with rings of armoured vehicles 
while masked men went from house to house, plundering anything of any value from 
within, wreaking wanton violence and cruel humiliations upon the occupants, and 
taking male inhabitants away for ‘filtration’ at ‘temporary filtration points’ set up at the 
edge of the village (SCH: 96-117).  
 
The process of filtration was supposed to lead to the identification and isolation of 
militants through various bureaucratic checks.  The reality was that it was a gateway 
practice to systematic terror and associated extortion, a “marauding and racketeering 
routine masked as searching for bandits [that] worked nonstop” (SCH: 51).  Filtration 
was characterised by initial non-selectivity and almost universal suspicion for those 
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between the ages of ten and sixty, and the grounds for extended detention were similarly 
broad and essentially arbitrary – because individuals were found in locations that were 
not their permanent address, because their documents were incomplete, because they 
shared a surname with a Chechen militant commander, because they ‘looked’ like 
fighters, even because they were ‘tall’ (Memorial 2007; Human Rights Watch 2000; 
SCH: 113). 5  In a report upon a purge in the village of Stargye Atagi, the twentieth that 
had taken place there since the war began, Politkovskaya details the nakedly 
commercial logic, rather than any military rationale, that actually underpinned the 
threat of filtration:  
 
The soldiers mainly took those who could not pay the ransom to the poultry farm 
[the temporary filtration point].  They entered the houses and demanded money 
for the men right away.  If you gave them the money, there was no filtration for 
you, no suspicion that you might be connected with the militant units.  If you 
didn’t, you got both filtration and suspicion. (SCH: 105) 
 
The experiences of those taken away for filtration typically consisted of malicious 
debasement, merciless beatings, and world-destroying torture at the hands of 
anonymous tormenters.  There was no semblance of due process and furthermore 
anonymity for soldiers during interactions with potential ‘terrorists’ was officially 
sanctioned to supposedly minimize the possibility of reprisals.  Little indication was 
ever given to detainees as to the reasons why they were being held, how long their 
punishment might last, or what might lead to its cessation.  Detainees would often be 
taken to, and moved between penitentiary camps, police stations, military bases and 
other ad hoc ‘reception centres’ that were all part of the wider reaches of the ‘filtration 
system’ in Chechnya (Memorial 2007).  Deaths in detention were commonplace.  
Information about the reasons for detainment, or the status and whereabouts of 
detainees, was systematically withheld from relatives and again subject to a callous 
mercantile logic.  Only shadowy, nameless intermediaries offered desperate families 
the hope of finding out about such matters, if sufficient further payments could be 
raised.  Any possibilities for the eventual return of detainees, or indeed for the return of 
dead bodies for burial, were similarly underpinned by cruel and systematic extortion 
that was marked by constantly shifting demands with little guarantee of any successful 
outcome.  Politkovskaya writes: 
 
Slave trading of arrested people exists everywhere .. but not everyone is able to 
come up with the money, since Chechnya is impoverished. Not everyone makes 
the deadline set by the officer.  And in such cases the arrested men disappear 
without a trace.  Or the middleman announces that the ransom is now for a 
corpse.  And the dead cost more than the living.  That’s how the military have 
arranged it, knowing that there is no greater torment for a Chechen than not to 
observe the funeral rites. (SCH: 68). 
 
Under the auspices of anti-terrorist operations then, a highly predatory and profitable 
war economy emerged, such that it seemed as if “the commerce in living and dead 
bodies by soldiers [is] the principal military operation in Chechnya” (SCH: 113).6 The 
dread that routine interaction could indiscriminately morph into something far more 
dangerous saturated and paralyzed everyday life – travelling by road across a network 
of identity checkpoints became a source of excessive risk; just going outside for a walk 
became newly hazardous and suspicious.  The ominous threat of corporeal 
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disappearance, the brutalizing of bodies, the buying and selling of hostages, and the 
trading of corpses and body parts became defining preoccupations of everyday 
existence in wartime Chechnya.  These were not simply new realities of occupied life 
but rather the unruly symptoms of a continuous disordering of any sense of ontological 
security, bodily integrity, a stable interaction order and the rules of living.  In such 
circumstances of lawlessness, indiscriminate predation and permanent flux, everyone 
was newly compelled to become a conscious strategist of survival, a lay theorist of the 
war, scrambling for footholds.  One Chechen mother whose 22-year old son had 
disappeared thus asks of Politkovskaya: 
 
 Most of all now we want to know the rules of the game. We want to understand 
which of us you don’t like.  And why?  What should we be tortured for?  What 
are the reasons you’ve been commanded to kill?  To kidnap?  Right now we 
don’t understand anything, and everyone is being destroyed in turn – those who 
were with the Wahhabis and those who were against them.  And most of all, 
those in the middle, who weren’t with anyone. (SCH: 117) 
 
Such pervasive incertitude was the breeding ground for countless rumours and 
contradictory myths – for example, that it was a positive sign if a corpse hadn’t surfaced 
within the first week of disappearance, or alternatively that it was an indication that no 
body, living or dead, would ever be offered up (SCH: 114).  In such a climate of radical 
doubt and ubiquitous threat, and the absence of any sure ideas of what to do and how 
to act, flimsy superstitions and lucky charms became surrogate guidelines for living 
and sources of belief.  Lying face down in a field while helicopters hover overhead, a 
surveyor called Vakha tells Politkovskaya of his desperate strategy to try and escape 
without being thought a terrorist: 
 
Every time the helicopters come, I take my folder, get out some paper, and 
pretend to write.  I think it helps .. I’ve never been wounded with this folder.  
Not in the first war and not in this one. It’s always helped me. (SCH: 33-4).   
 
A day afterwards he is dead, ripped to shreds along with his folder whilst wandering 
exhausted into an unmapped minefield.  There is no talisman that is capable of 
providing immunity from all the known and unknown threats that exist and that must 
at times be played off against each other.  In an isolated mountain village, where 
everyone knows that you risk being shot if found in the surrounding forest, the 
inhabitants are forced to tempt fate anyway in order to collect the firewood that they so 
desperately need to keep warm.  As Politkovskaya notes, “Readiness to die is the main 
requirement of their existence, which flits between life and death every minute” (SCH: 
57). 
 
For Russian soldier Arkady Babchenko, the experience of Chechnya was similarly 
characterised by existential duality, incomprehension of the ‘rules’, the utter absence 
of morale and morality in the Federal army, and by total state indifference to the fate of 
the ordinary private.  Even the dog-tags supplied by the government were made of the 
sort of flimsy aluminium that would melt in a small fire, leaving new recruits to try and 
inscribe their own identities using nails onto makeshift dog-tags fabricated from the 
galvanized metal of broken spoons (OSW: 128).  Most significantly though, Babchenko 
details a wartime experience dominated by a brutally dehumanizing institution where, 
rather than interaction based around order and discipline, it was the practice of 
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dedovshchina, the excessively violent and ruthless use and abuse of those in the lower 
ranks by the upper echelons, that had become the central principle around which 
everyday army life was organized.  Indeed, bullying was a principle that had become 
intensified by a radically anomic lack of restraint in the senior ranks during the war and 
by the significant presence among the kontraktniki, contracted soldiers, of ex-criminals 
who were “creatures more of gangland than a modern European Army” (de Waal 2001: 
xxvi).  
 
Under such brutal conditions, the key task of the federal conscript became simply to try 
not to attract any form of attention or opprobrium, not to offer any sort of presence 
which might offend, by avoiding eye contact, lying low and “switching on the fool” if 
interaction was inescapable (OSW: 57).  Violence was impossible to completely avoid 
however and when your turn to be beaten inevitably came around, there was nothing 
that could be done: “You either take it in the face or hang yourself – that’s your entire 
choice” (OSW: 70).  In one company, Babchenko chronicles how: 
 
the bullying there is like a well-oiled machine .. this column of walking dead 
cares nothing about anything: the war, Chechnya, the heaps of bodies at the 
airstrip.  They are only worried about tonight, when the officers leave the 
barracks .. and they will get beaten with spades.  In the morning the officers 
will come back .. and beat them again for having spade-marks on their faces. 
(OSW: 85)  
 
Babchenko thus details not so much an institution straining under the test of a fierce 
campaign but the complete moral decomposition of the army, a disavowal of any 
expectation of ethical interaction and values whatsoever. Alongside the systematic 
filtration and extortion of Chechen civilians, and the vicious culture of bullying in the 
ranks, the army was characterised by widespread drunkenness, corruption, and the 
hawking of stolen goods.  For Babchenko, it appeared that: 
 
Thieving is both the foundation of the war and the reason for its continuing.  
The soldiers sell cartridges; the drivers sell diesel; the cooks sell tinned meat .. 
Regimental commanders truck away vehicle-loads of gear, while the generals 
steal the actual vehicles themselves .. And we’ve all been sold too, guts and all 
.. our lives were traded long ago to pay for luxurious houses for generals that 
are springing up in the elite suburbs of Moscow. (OSW: 306) 
 
The officers seemed to have “turned into an organised gang that exists separately from 
the soldiers” (OSW: 307), viewing their soldiers simply as ‘vouchers’ to be spent, and 
loathed back in turn as ‘jackals’, shot in the back when any chance arose in battle.  
Babchenko’s judgment is damning:  “Ours is an army of workers and peasants, reduced 
to desperation by constant under-funding, half-crazed with hunger ... flogged and 
beaten by all, regardless of the consequences .. stripped of all rights.  This is not an 
army but a herd drawn from the dregs of the criminal masses, lawless apart from the 
dictates of the jackals that run it” (OSW: 308). 
 
Within such a mercenary culture, with only a perverse sense of being in this together, 
prioritizing one’s own survival and individualized war aims came to dominate.  While 
tasked with a particular brief of salvaging a damaged water tanker, Babchenko and a 
colleague run into a situation where other Russian soldiers have been pinned down by 
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a Chechen sniper and are at risk of their lives.  However, although they could assist 
their fellow soldiers, Babchenko and his colleague choose to do nothing, reaching an 
unspoken understanding with the sniper not to define the situation to either of their 
detriments: 
 
We weren’t supposed to be fighting here; we’d only come to pick up our water 
tanker, which had been shot up from that very house where the sniper was holed 
up now.  The Chechen could see us too, but he wasn’t firing at us, concentrating 
on a more attractive target .. our guys saw only the sniper, who had become the 
most important and fearful thing on earth for them, and they desperately wanted 
someone to kill him.  But no-one touched him, because to kill him or dig him out 
of the house would be difficult .. there would be a firefight when he started 
shooting back .. and no-one wanted that .. he wasn’t shooting at us so there was 
no need to bother him unnecessarily. (OSW: 252-253) 
 
With this brief tacit allegiance in place, Babchenko and his colleague complete their 
own isolated task, salvage the water tanker and disappear from the scene, allowing the 
other sequestered act of conflict to play out without disturbance: “For us, the war was 
over for the day, and we left” (OSW: 253).  Beyond such temporary constructions of 
alliance for localized mutual benefits, more systematic ongoing collusion and 
networking between sometime adversaries for criminal exploitation and financial gain 
was a highly significant feature of the Chechen wars, as indeed was the fluid switching 
of sides by fighters, units, even entire militias for wider strategic and political reasons.7 
Wartime Chechnya was thus an environment in which shifting allegiances and 
identities 8 , disjointed actions, and an over-riding sense of uncertainty dominated 
everyday life for both civilians and federal soldiers.  
 
Fragile Humanity 
 
Whilst deep unease and incertitude were dominant structures of feeling in Chechnya 
during wartime, the precarious accomplishment of civility and humanity did not 
completely disappear from the horizon of everyday life within the ruins.  Babchenko 
describes one occasion when, upon finding the keys to an intact and homely apartment 
in an otherwise destroyed and abandoned block in Grozny, he resists the opportunity to 
loot it, and instead uses it to performatively re-enact a comforting routine from his pre-
war life, when his girlfriend would greet his arrival back home from work: 
 
I thought up a game.  In the evening, when it got dark, I would come home from 
work and open my door with my keys.  Boy, what a joy it is to unlock your door 
with your own keys, to enter your home and flop down exhausted in the 
armchair.  To let your head loll back as you light up a cigarette and close your 
eyes… She comes over to me, curls up on my lap and tenderly rests her head on 
my chest .. “Go and wash your hands, supper’s ready.  I’ve made borscht, the 
real thing, not the half-cooked slop they give you at work.” (OSW: 25) 
 
The physical props and the embodied movements of putting the keys in the door, 
flopping down on the armchair, lighting a cigarette, and closing the eyes do not so much 
support a fantasy as make a habitual domestic reverie newly material in the midst of 
chaos.  Babchenko envisions a tender exchange with his girlfriend over supper, but 
inevitably it is still one that is shot through with the materiality of the war  - “take off 
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your webbing first, silly.. and don’t dip your grenades in the soup, give them here.  I’ll 
put them on the windowsill.”  Eventually she sends him back to work and the spell is 
broken:  
 
I open my eyes and sit motionless for a while.  My soul is empty, barren. The 
ash from my cigarette has dropped onto the carpet.  I am seized with melancholy 
but I also feel good, as if it had all really happened  .. I came a few times to the 
apartment every day and played the ‘peace game’ .. Later, when we moved on, 
I dropped by one last time, stood on the threshold and carefully closed the door.  
I left the key in the lock. (OSW: 26) 
 
In not looting the apartment and deliberately leaving the key carefully in the lock when 
he eventually leaves for the final time, Babchenko not only preserves his own embodied 
memories of peace but temporally extends this imaginative horizon of a civil interaction 
order and this material gesture of home to the next unknown guest. 
 
Politkovskaya also details a defiant attempt to preserve humanity in the tiny ruined 
kitchen of another Grozny apartment.  Sasha and Vika Jura are a severely disabled 
couple who have been pinned down for months in their flat, surrounded by burned and 
bombed out blocks, but who nonetheless engage in the joint cultivation of hope using 
whatever imaginative acts, material detritus, recitals of civilized customs, and idioms 
of love that they can muster.  They endeavour to look decent, Sasha assiduously 
combing his hair, and pretend that the liquid they consume is actually ‘morning tea’.  
Vika spends her days writing poetry about the war in old school notebooks, reciting it 
coquettishly to Sahsa who laughs and teases whilst radiating pride in her performances.  
All the while bullets strafe outside their windows, bodies lie unburied in the street, and 
the city burns.  Politkovskaya writes:  
 
Here, in the smouldering ruins of Grozny, there’s nothing to see except 
suffering, your own and others’.  Yet it is precisely here that life is the most real, 
even though it’s almost like a cave, and the three-by-three patch in the kitchen 
resembles a stage.  And for some reason you keep your comb in a refrigerator.  
There hasn’t been any electricity for a few years now .. The refrigerator has 
turned into a closet, suitable only for keeping combs.  A stove? The family has 
one of those.  There’s no gas though.  And for that reason the pots arranged on 
it are just symbols of a struggle for a better future, in which there will be gas, 
and you won’t have to make fires in the street to cook.  A sink? Of course!  But 
unfortunately there is no water in the pipes.  And there’s a lampshade hanging 
overhead, but no light. (SCH: 77) 
 
Not only does Politkovskaya divine real joy in their impish and improvised refusal to 
accept the imposed conditions of bare life, she reads in their vibrant performance of 
defiant civilized living a wider repudiation of the emotional mendacity of Moscow life, 
a metropolitan lifestyle that tries to carry on regardless of the war on its citizens at the 
periphery, preferring not to think about it, not to feel it.  Politkovskaya thus writes of 
the Grozny couple’s wartime performance that: 
 
Everything in their kitchen is like a stage prop – the stove, the refrigerator, and 
the faucets - except for the feelings.  And in Moscow kitchens everything is real 
– the stove, the gas, the hot and cold water from the faucets – except for the 
 9 
feelings.  There, it’s the feelings that are just props.  We’re too satiated for a 
country that’s been at war for so long. (SCH: 77) 
 
It is in these fragile yet determined performances of civility, these “sublime moments 
of human effort to just stay humane” (Derluguian 2003: 25), that the complexity and 
contradictions of wartime life are revealed, where vicious constraint and cruelty may 
co-exist with life-affirming creativity and emotional clarity.   
 
With the radical uncertainty of the mundane interaction order and the associated 
atrophy of wider public morality, Politkovskaya locates such small oases of hope and 
the practice of humanity primarily in the resilient citation of discrete codes of 
interaction that determinedly refuse to acknowledge the primacy of adversarial 
identification.  She encounters doctors whose professional identity and dedication to 
the Hippocratic Oath overrides both any partisanship in who they will treat, as well as 
the desperation of their material circumstances, as they are forced to power operating 
equipment and X-ray machines with their own car batteries whenever the generators go 
down (DW: 218).  She describes teachers who will not break their promise to any of 
their pupils and continue to hold classes and nurture civility in the ashes of former 
schools, cultivating rare pride in every child by bestowing full marks upon every essay 
that manages to be submitted in such times (DW: 157).  Whilst wider public interaction 
during the war was often characterised by paranoid uncertainty and ambiguity, it was 
often through these fragile performances of tender familial love9 and precarious recitals 
of alternative ethical codes that attempts were made to cultivate and hold onto another 
sense of humanity in the midst of the war.  
 
 
Emotional Aftermaths 
 
Despite these life-affirming but transitory interludes of alternate values and citations of 
resilient and pacific humanity, Babchenko’s and Politkovskaya’s narratives of the war 
are ultimately accounts where an increasingly jaded cynicism becomes the dominant 
structure of feeling for those who experience, and even those who manage to live 
through, the war.  The emotional consequences of holding, over a sustained period of 
time, such close proximity to brutality and destruction, of constantly negotiating 
uncertainty and ambivalence, of maintaining a vigilance that brooks no trust in 
everyday interactions, the material world, or even one’s own senses, ultimately leaves 
an embodied and affective aftermath that is deeply alienating and not easily shed.   
 
At the end of One Soldier’s War In Chechnya, Babchenko describes his halting attempts 
to reintegrate into everyday Moscow life upon his return from the war: 
 
You learn to walk without checking the ground beneath your feet for mines and 
tripwires, and step on manholes in the road without fear, and stand at your full 
height in open ground .. You start to get drawn into life.  You get interested in 
this game, which isn’t for real.  You pass yourself off as a fully fledged member 
of society, and the mask of a normal person grows onto you, no longer rejected 
by your body.  And those around you think you are just the same as everyone 
else ..  
But no-one knows your real face, and no-one knows that you are no 
longer a person .. You don’t tell anyone the truth anymore.  You can’t explain 
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what war really is to someone who has never been there .. They simply don’t 
have the necessary sensory organs.  (OSW: 398-399) 
 
Babchenko’s description is of a war experience that is ultimately liminal, an experience 
that casts him on his return into yet another world of enduring uncertainty and 
ambivalence, where he is forever waiting for the why of the war to be revealed, where 
he feels as if he should not have, or indeed has not really, returned.  It is this suspended 
and haunted existence that is the force that animates his writing.10  He closes his 
memoirs by recounting an exchange with another unnamed and forgotten veteran, one 
of the approximately one million military personnel who passed through Chechnya, one 
of the many who now spends his days sitting and smoking in a Moscow subway 
station.11  However, despite an initial sense of empathy in the encounter, it too ends 
with no real closure:  
 
His eyes recede again behind a film of indifference. 
“Half-truths everywhere, half-sincerity, half-friendship.  I can’t accept 
that.  Here in civilian life they have only half-truths.  And the small measure of 
truth we had in war was a big lie.  So many lads died and I survived.  The whole 
time I used to wonder what for? .. Maybe I lived so that others remember us? I 
am a reminder.” 
I get up silently and leave him cigarettes, matches and vodka .. I walk 
away without saying anything and he doesn’t even look at me.  For him I am 
also ‘one of them’.  Which means whatever I say is a half-truth. (OSW: 405)   
     
Politkovskaya relatedly describes the emotional confusions, intensities and sometimes 
even paradoxes that accompany the chaotic disorder of war.  In a poignant personal 
conversation with a Russian colonel she has only just met, both on a high from having 
temporarily evaded danger, Politkovskaya describes the new perspective that the war 
has given her on her own life, how worries about money and the fact that her husband 
has left her now feel like trivial nonsense: 
 
“I’m thankful for the war.  I got here by chance and got stuck here by chance 
as well.  But now I know how to rise above all this nonsense.  It has purified me 
of everything that was superfluous, unnecessary.  How can I not be thankful?” 
Mironov silently agreed.  He told me nothing about himself, but I still 
understood, without any words. We shared the same blood that had been poured 
into our veins by the war.  It rushed inside our bodies like hormones, all too 
often taking us nowhere, into a dark room without doors.  When it let us go at 
the very last moment, we realized how lonely we were.  Our fate was to look for 
people who were similar to us in this world, who knew something about life that 
most people would never experience.  Perhaps we would like to share this secret 
with them, but they didn’t want to know and didn’t care. (SCH: 199-200) 
 
For Politkovskaya, a powerful appreciation and revaluation of life thus supplements the 
constant closeness to death in war, but she simultaneously describes the cruel 
recognition that such vital feelings are often fleeting, unshareable and isolating.  
Alongside her undoubted tenacity and bravery12, it is her desire to try and describe the 
myriad everyday lives and ordinary confusions of war in as much detail as possible, 
and to try and create a language that can render some of these seemingly 
incommunicable experiences and contradictions more understandable and more 
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shareable that makes her reportage so distinctive and important.13  For Politkovskaya 
attentiveness to detail is in itself a necessary ethical response to the intense confusions, 
deceptions and disavowals of wartime.  Describing the precise look of a gang of men 
in Grozny - possibly mercenaries, possibly soldiers - who are mocking a group of 
demonstrators whose relatives have disappeared, she writes:  
 
They are cheerful and vigorous, with strong, healthy teeth.  They’re wearing 
masks and bandannas, with automatic weapons and grenade launchers pointed 
at the crowd.  They’re convulsed with laughter, leaning against the armour in 
ecstasy, and that’s why their rows of powerful fangs can be seen through the 
holes in their masks ..  
Of course all of this is details ..  But it is from just these details that we 
find out what life is about.  As if it weren’t bad enough that your mother or child 
has been taken away and their bodies haven’t been returned – they also have to 
mock your pain!  Who can stop this?  Putin? The minister of defence?  The 
attorney general?  No.  These gentlemen aren’t trained to think about details. 
(SCH: 131-132) 
 
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 
At one level, Babchenko and Politkovskaya’s writing is an impassioned ethical attempt 
to try and reveal the metaphorical fangs behind the mask, to expose the wider hidden 
rationalities and mendacities of the war in Chechnya.  Babchenko recounts bewildered 
conversations that regularly take place in the federal army where his comrades 
sarcastically discuss the latest performative political utterances and official strategic 
definitions of the situation, concluding that “the ‘restoration of constitutional order’ and 
the ‘counter-terrorist operation’ are nothing but meaningless words that are cited to 
justify the murder of thousands of people” (OSW: 94).  Politkovskaya is similarly 
scathing of such political and linguistic mendacity, and particularly of the fact that the 
official pronouncements are subject to minimal examination by a largely compliant 
Moscow media that prefers to deal in talking-heads generals, blithe assurances that 
everything is in hand, and the production of “stirring reports about the war in the North 
Caucasus, in which the most terrible and disturbing facts are sanitized so that the voters 
don’t choke on their food” (DW: 64).  By describing the everyday experiences of those 
caught up in the conflict, both writers endeavor to document the texture of a radically 
different reality from this remote and sanitized version of the war, detailing its brutal 
and senseless conduct and its brazen criminal and commercial logics.  As such, both 
suggest that the greatest masquerade of all may be the very idea of the war itself, in that 
events on the ground do not resemble any recognizable conflict between opposing sides 
that is being won or lost, but rather constitute some endlessly protean and regenerating 
enterprise that is perpetually breeding off bodies and blood.  Politkovskaya thus writes 
that:   
 
We don’t even know if it’s a real war or not.  We already know that there will 
never be a victory.  It’s like some crazy, broken merry-go-round dangling little 
zinc coffins instead of horses (DW: 207) 
 
At this everyday level of analysis, and here I am reading their work in terms of 
Goffman’s understanding of the centrality of routine interactional masquerade to the 
 12 
mutual reproduction of normal patterns of mundane social life, their writing also 
outlines the contours of a radically threatening new condition of permanent disruption, 
uncertainty and anxiety in the everyday interaction order, a condition which is itself 
perversely and explicitly pointed to by the literal appearance of the mask in public life.  
As McDonald (2013) notes, the wearer of a mask stands beyond the everyday social 
world’s norms and obligations, and masking is an idiom that is widely associated in 
many societies with transition and metamorphosis from one social state to another.  The 
highly salient advent and domination of masked men of uncertain identity in the 
prosecution of the Chechnya war enterprise does not simply and prosaically hide the 
wearers’ faces to prevent identification. It also signifies the irruption of this widespread 
new condition of permanent disorder and terror, the mocking of pain and the collapse 
into short-termism and incertitude of a previously stable public interaction order 
through which civil identities could be negotiated and moral recognition achieved.  
Masking is here the symbolic and literal harbinger of filtration and other debasements 
of civil interaction. It instantiates the condition of perpetual confusion as to the arbitrary 
and ever-changing rules of the game that Babchenko and Politkovskaya document.   
 
This chapter thus argues for a wider reading of the work of Babchenko and 
Politkovskaya, on the grounds that their writing is an enduring source of crucial insights 
into the brutally violated texture of everyday life in wartime Chechnya.  It has also 
attempted to illustrate how the lens and language of everyday performance, interaction 
and masquerade may enable us to re-engage with such topics14 and sources afresh.  In 
doing so, I have not sought to strictly operationalize specific analytic concepts onto a 
particular field of inquiry.  Rather this chapter has adopted an approach that treats such 
analytic language as sensitizing heuristics, orienting attention towards the ways in 
which human recognition, morality and identity are continually negotiated, constituted 
and interrupted through specific social interactions in wartime.  As such, this chapter 
has endeavoured to explore how a methodology of dialogically weaving together 
experiential testimonies with such conceptual vocabularies of the everyday might 
extend our imaginative horizons and abilities to write of war anew.  To conclude, 
Babchenko sums up his experience of Chechnya as follows:  
 
We don’t know what we are fighting for.  We have no goals, no morals or 
internal justification for what we do.  We are sent off to kill and to meet our 
deaths but we don’t know why.  We just drew the short straw, happened to be 
born eighteen years ago and grew up just in time for this war. (OSW: 161).    
 
For Politkovskaya, these patterns of brutality and brutalization, of arbitrariness and the 
atrophy of morality, are ultimately not containable to this one ‘small corner of hell’.  
Rather “Chechnya” marks a new structure of feeling and interaction that contaminates 
the entire country as a million troops carry it home: 
 
After this unrestrained lawlessness, they leave for their homes, all over the 
country. Chechnya as a mode of thinking, feeling and acting, spreads 
everywhere like gangrenous cells and turns into a nationwide tragedy, affecting 
all strata of society. (SCH: 134) 
 
 
Notes 
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1 Following its declaration of independence in November 1991, the Russian Federation waged 
two wars against the de facto republic of Chechnya.  The First Chechen War lasted from 
December 1994 to August 1996 and ended in a cease-fire and a five-year moratorium on the 
final status of the republic.  Following the invasion of neighbouring Dagestan by paramilitary 
forces led from Chechnya by Shamil Basayev and Ibn Al-Khattab, Russia launched the Second 
Chechen War in August 1999 to restore federal control over the territory.  It re-established rule 
by a pro-Russian administration in May 2000 but counter-insurgency warfare continued to be 
waged by Federal forces against the rebels for the next decade, with the operation finally being 
declared over in April 2009. 
 
2 Politkovskaya reported on the wars for the Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta.  Although she 
is most well known in the West for her work in Chechnya, Politkovskaya is explicit that she is 
not a war correspondent.  In the prologue to A Small Corner of Hell, she states that: “I am a 
journalist – and this is the only reason I’ve seen the war; I was sent there to cover it.  Not, 
however, because I am a war correspondent and know this subject well.  On the contrary, 
because I am just a civilian.  The editor in chief’s idea was very simple: the very fact that I’m 
just a civilian gives me a much deeper understanding of the experiences of other civilians, living 
in Chechen towns and villages, who are caught in the war” (SCH: 26).  
 
3 Babchenko fought in the First Chechen War as an eighteen year-old conscript to the Russian 
Federal Army and then returned to fight in the Second War as a contracted soldier for a further 
six months.  
  
4 Rigi (2007), for example, theorizes the war in terms of what he calls ‘the chaotic mode of 
domination’, the post-Soviet expression of a non-hegemonic and extra-legal form of predatory 
rule whereby various gangs and elite networks of influence provoked, competed, and colluded 
for control of territory at the periphery and the exploitation of resources therein, 
opportunistically and often mutually benefitting from the war economy created.  He ultimately 
argues that the war only really became chauvinistic and nationalized, overcoming a widely held 
belief among ordinary Chechens and Russians in shared Soviet identity, “not because people 
supported their own leaders’ war efforts but because the combatants indiscriminately violated 
the civilian population of the other side” (2007: 46).   
 
5 The Russian human rights organization Memorial estimates that from a population of less 
than one million, a conservative estimate was that 200,000 Chechens passed through the 
‘filtration system’ between 1999 and 2006 (Memorial 2007). 
 
6 The shadow war economy also involved the widespread collaboration of Federal forces with 
criminal Chechen gangs in numerous other lucrative activities, notably the large-scale theft of 
the region’s oil resources, and arms trading.   
 
7 Most notoriously, Akhmad Kadyrov, commander of a powerful clan-based paramilitary force 
that fought for Chechen independence in the First War, switched sides and fought for the 
Federal forces against his former allies from 1999 onwards, for which he was rewarded by 
being appointed acting head of the Chechen administration when Russia regained control of 
Grozny in July 2000. 
 
8 In Mikail Eldin’s (2013) memoirs of the war The Sky Wept Fire: My Life as a Chechen 
Freedom Fighter, he details how this trickster environment was both a source of constant 
concern to the unit of partisan fighters that he was associated with, as well as something that 
could be explicitly exploited by them.  Apart from a small core of full-time combatants, all the 
other fighters in the unit only came together to undertake specific operations, would only be 
partially known to each other, and would address each other only by their ‘war names’.  Once 
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the operations were completed, the survivors would splinter apart and attempt to ‘go legal’ – 
return to work in normal occupations - until a new combination of fighters was called together 
by the leadership for the next operation.  The likelihood of infiltration in such a structure was 
high and thus operations would often be undertaken by rebel commanders in the full knowledge 
that their plans and routes would likely be betrayed to the enemy from within.  However, this 
expectation of betrayal would itself be offset by last minute changes of tactics.  It was even 
deliberately exploited as a way of lulling enemies into a false sense of advantage and trapping 
them in unexpected ambushes of their own making.  Multiple layers of deception and double 
bluff were thus key elements of insurgent warcraft.  Of course deception is central to multiple 
forms and aspects of warcraft – from code-making to camouflage.  The central place of 
‘cunning’ and ‘deceit’ in military strategy is acknowledged throughout Clausewitz’ On War. 
As Scarry notes, war involves the derealization of all normal structures of substantiation, of 
meaning-making, and hence the elevation to structural centrality of “the principle of lying” 
(1981: 133). 
 
9 Politkovskaya also argues that, “in such circumstances it should come as no surprise that the 
most effective antidote to war as in any primitive society is the maternal instinct” (DW: 50).  
For example, she describes how hundreds of the mothers of Russian soldiers, terrified by the 
brutality and moral decay of the Federal army, travel to army compounds in Chechnya in order 
to ‘kidnap’ their sons and bring them home, “transforming them into deserters and themselves 
into accessories to the crime” (DW: 45) 
 
10 As McLoughlin (2009) notes, a motif of much war writing is that it regularly foregrounds its 
own inadequacy, the impossibility of adequate sense-making in the disorientating fog of war, 
the futility of representation faced with war’s overwhelming reality.  As well as being a personal 
attempt to impose some verbal order on that which may otherwise seem incomprehensible, 
Babchenko describes numerous other motivations underpinning his war writing – coping and 
catharsis, ‘truth-telling’, writing out of a sense of guilt for surviving and a related sense of duty 
to tell the story of those who did not survive.  
 
11 Eichler (2011) details the widespread social marginalization of the Chechentsy, the Russian 
veterans of the Chechen wars, and attributes this to a number of factors: the traumatic effects 
of combat experience which hindered their social and economic reintegration into society; the 
state’s lack of recognition of the Chechen conflicts as wars until 2002, meaning that those who 
had fought were not officially recognized as war veterans and hence not entitled to the welfare 
benefits associated with such status; and wider societal uncertainty as to the rationale for, and 
rectitude of, the conflict which translated into ambivalence towards the soldiers, particularly in 
comparison with the almost universally lauded veterans of the Great Patriotic War (World War 
II).  Eichler thus points to a crisis in the models of militarized masculinity associated with the 
Chechen wars. 
 
12 Politkovskaya documents her own firsthand experience of harassment and torture by the 
Federal Security Services in A Small Corner of Hell.  She writes: “The soldiers, rulers of local 
life, have created a barbaric order in which anyone who knows about the actual conditions of 
the civilian population can be equated to an enemy spy and has to be dealt with according to 
wartime laws” (SCH: 87).  She also notes how, in order to reach places where access has been 
denied, journalists have to employ “all the guiles of the partisan: wearing different clothes, 
lying their heads off, and, in some cases, giving various forms of bribe to those at the federal 
checkpoints” (DW: 151). 
 
13 Rodgers (2014) argues that the significance of Politkovskaya’s writing can be understood in 
terms of an important and long-standing tradition of links between literature and public debate 
in Russia.  He endorses Vartanova’s historical analysis of such connections whereby “the 
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Russian vision of literature presupposed a much broader social and cultural role for it than in 
other countries, thus often merging it with journalistic activity” (2012: 136). 
 
14 There is an emerging literature (see Bharucha 2014, Hughes 2011, Rowe 2013, Spencer (ed.) 
2012) which creatively explores the relationships between performance, protest and terror, and 
the war on terror in particular, but as yet limited analogous work examining everyday wartime 
life.  Maltby (2012) draws explicitly on Goffman in her analysis of Military Media Operations 
in terms of strategic interaction, impression management and influencing activities.  
 
References 
 
Babchenko, A. (2007) One Soldier’s War in Chechnya London: Portobello Books 
 
Bellamy, A. (2012) Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age of Civilian 
Immunity Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Bharucha, R. (2014) Terror and Performance London: Routledge 
Clausewitz, C. (1976) On War, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
Derluguian, G. (2003) ‘Whose Truth?’ in Politkovskaya, A., A Small Corner of Hell: 
Dispatches from Chechnya, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1-25 
 
De Waal, T. (2001) ‘Introduction’ in Politkovskaya, A., A Dirty War: A Russian 
Reporter in Chechnya, London: The Harvill Press 
 
Doniger, W. (2005) The woman who pretended to be who she was: myths of self-
imitation Oxford: Oxford University Press   
 
Eichler, M. (2011) ‘Russian veterans of the Chechen wars: a feminist analysis of 
militarized masculinities’ in Tickner, J. and Sjoberg, A. (eds) Feminism and 
International Relations: Conversations about Past, Present and Future, London: 
Routledge, 123-140 
 
Eldin, M. (2013) The Sky Wept Fire: My Life as a Chechen Freedom Fighter, London: 
Portobello Books 
 
Evangelista, M. (2002) The Chechen wars: will Russia go the way of the Soviet Union? 
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press  
 
Goffman, E. (1959) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life Harmondsworth: Penguin 
 
Hughes, J. (2011) Performance in a time of terror: critical mimesis and the age of 
uncertainty, Manchester: Manchester University Press 
 
Human Rights Watch (2000) Welcome to Hell: Arbitrary Detention, Torture, and 
Extortion in Chechnya, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/russia_chechnya4/ 
 
 16 
 
Lapidus, G. (1999) ‘Dynamics of Secession in the Russian Federation: Why 
Chechnya?’ in Alexseev, M. (ed) Center-Periphery Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia, 
New York: St Martin’s Press 
 
Lawler, S. (2014) Identity: Sociological Perspectives (2nd edn) Cambridge: Polity 
 
Maltby, S. (2012) Military Media Management: Negotiating the 'Front' Line in 
Mediatized War,  London: Routledge 
 
McDonald, K. (2013) Our Violent World: Terrorism in Society Basingstoke: Palgrave  
 
McLoughlin, K. (2009) ‘War and Words’ in McLoughlin, K (ed.) The Cambridge 
Companion to War Writing Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 15-24 
 
Memorial (2007) “Counterterrorism Operation” by the Russian Federation in 
the Northern Caucasus throughout 1999-2006, available at: 
 http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/N-Caucas/dkeng.htm 
 
Politkovskaya, A. (2001) A Dirty War: A Russian Reporter in Chechnya London: The 
Harvill Press 
 
Politkovskaya, A. (2003) A Small Corner of Hell: Dispatches from Chechnya Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press 
 
Rigi, J. (2007) The War in Chechnya: The Chaotic Mode of Domination, Violence and 
Bare Life in the Post-Soviet Context, Critique of Anthropology, 27, 1, 37-62 
 
Rodgers, J. (2014) From Stalingrad to Grozny: Patriotism, political pressure, and 
literature in the war reporting of Vassily Grossman and Anna Politkovskaya, Media, 
War and Conflict 7, 1, 23-36 
 
Rowe, C. (2013) The Politics of Protest and US Foreign Policy: Performative 
Construction of the War on Terror, London: Routledge 
 
Scarry, E. (1985) The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Smith, G. (2006) Erving Goffman London: Routledge 
 
Spencer, J. (ed) (2012) Political and Protest Theatre after 9/11: Patriotic Dissent, 
London: Routledge 
 
Sylvester, C. (2011) ‘Pathways to experiencing war’ in C. Sylvester (ed.) Experiencing 
War. London: Routledge. 
 
Sylvester, C. (2012) War Experiences/War Practices/War Theory, Millennium 40, 3, 
483-503 
 
 17 
 
Vartanova E. (2012) ‘The Russian media model in the context of post-Soviet dynamics’ 
in Hallin D. and Mancini, P. (eds) Comparing Media Systems Beyond the Western 
World. New York: Cambridge University Press, 119–142.  
 
